Daijiworld Media Network - Damascus
Damascus, Sep 2: Israel’s continued military actions in Syria are putting the country’s new leadership in an increasingly difficult position as it seeks to rebuild state institutions, restore its economy and regain control over its territory without being drawn into a direct confrontation.
Israeli forces recently shelled a hilltop near Beit Jinn in the western Damascus countryside and carried out a raid in a village in Quneitra province. The attacks came days after Israeli fighter jets struck the Abu al-Duhur military base in northern Syria, causing significant damage.
Israel said the Abu al-Duhur strike was aimed at preventing a possible Turkish military deployment at the facility, a claim disputed by both Damascus and Ankara. Despite efforts by the Syrian government to reduce tensions through diplomatic channels and criticism from Washington over the strike, Israeli military operations have continued.
The government of President Ahmed al-Sharaa has so far avoided military confrontation while maintaining that Israel should withdraw from Syrian territory it has occupied. Damascus has also insisted on its right to rebuild its armed forces and establish military partnerships of its choosing.
The situation highlights not only Syria’s military weakness but also the strategy adopted by its new leadership. Al-Sharaa’s government appears to believe that restoring state institutions and rebuilding national capabilities must come before attempting to challenge Israel militarily.
Syria’s military position remains fragile. After the collapse of former President Bashar al-Assad’s army in late 2024, Israel targeted strategic military assets across the country. The new government was subsequently left with the task of rebuilding a national security structure from weakened institutions and a collection of armed groups.
For now, a Syrian military response capable of significantly changing Israel’s behaviour appears unlikely.
Instead, al-Sharaa has prioritised economic recovery and international legitimacy. His government has focused on rebuilding state institutions, restructuring the security sector, restoring energy supplies, improving diplomatic ties and reconnecting Syria with the international economy.
The scale of the reconstruction challenge is enormous. The World Bank has estimated that rebuilding Syria’s damaged physical assets could cost around $216 billion. Meeting such needs will require more than military institutions, with the country also needing stronger state revenues, electricity supplies, functioning administration, banking access, investment and international partnerships.
Damascus has made considerable progress in improving its international position. The United States dismantled its broad Syria sanctions programme in 2025, while the European Union lifted its economic sanctions, although targeted and security-related measures remain. Washington also removed Syria from its State Sponsors of Terrorism list on August 24, further reducing a major obstacle to financial normalisation and investment.
For the Syrian government, these developments provide greater resources and opportunities to rebuild the state. They also make avoiding a major military escalation increasingly important.
A serious confrontation with Israel could undermine investor confidence, complicate Syria’s reintegration into the international financial system and weaken diplomatic support for its reconstruction. It could also expose Damascus to renewed political pressure from Washington and the European Union.
This has created a difficult dilemma for al-Sharaa. Restraint helps preserve the international environment Syria needs for recovery, but it can also provide Israel with greater room to restrict the military and strategic capabilities Damascus is attempting to rebuild.
Israel has cited security concerns over Syria’s new leadership, which emerged from an armed Islamist movement, as well as growing concerns over Turkey’s military relationship with Damascus. However, Israeli demands have extended beyond preventing hostile forces from approaching its borders.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has called for the demilitarisation of Syria’s Quneitra, Deraa and Suwayda provinces. His government has also opposed the deployment of forces from Syria’s new army south of Damascus and sought to limit the scope of military cooperation between Damascus and Ankara.
Israel’s position effectively seeks to limit the reconstruction of Syria’s military capacity, which it views through the lens of preventive security. Damascus, however, regards the issue as one of national sovereignty, arguing that a state cannot fully regain strategic autonomy if it cannot determine where its forces are deployed or with whom it cooperates militarily.
The approach carries another risk for al-Sharaa: domestic public opinion. Continued Israeli attacks without a visible Syrian response could eventually affect public confidence in the new government.
A 2025 survey by the Arab Center Washington DC found that 74% of Syrians opposed recognising Israel, while 70% rejected an agreement that did not include the return of the Golan Heights. As many as 88% said Israel posed a threat to Syria’s security and stability, while 61% believed the government’s foreign policy reflected the views of the Syrian people.
The findings do not necessarily indicate support for military retaliation, particularly as the survey predates the latest confrontations. Instead, they highlight political red lines and the importance of the sovereignty issue among Syrians.
Broader Arab public opinion has also remained strongly opposed to recognising Israel, according to the 2025 Arab Opinion Index.
The challenge facing al-Sharaa is therefore to maintain restraint without appearing to accept a permanent erosion of Syrian sovereignty. The previous Assad governments largely avoided direct confrontation with Israel while maintaining alliances and armed networks that provided Damascus with regional influence.
Al-Sharaa’s government appears to be pursuing a different strategy based on stronger state institutions, economic recovery, international engagement and the rebuilding of a national military.
The strategy does not replace territorial sovereignty but seeks to rebuild the capacity required to exercise it.
Its success will ultimately depend on whether restored state capacity can give Syria greater control over its territory, security decisions and foreign relations while maintaining the international support needed for the country’s recovery.