Daijiworld Media Network - Los Angeles
Los Angeles, Oct 2: A comprehensive review of last year’s deadly Los Angeles-area wildfires has found major failures in emergency communications, preparedness and coordination among agencies responding to the blazes.
The 724-page report, released Friday by UL Research Institutes (ULRI), found that authorities were not adequately prepared or trained for the extreme conditions and struggled to coordinate as the fires rapidly intensified.
During the fires, police dispatchers temporarily routed 911 calls through a captain’s personal cellphone after emergency systems became overwhelmed. The volume of calls was so high that some firefighter units went “dark”, meaning dispatchers could no longer track them. As communication systems deteriorated, some firefighters began relying on instructions from captains they trusted rather than senior agency leadership.
On the night the Eaton Fire rapidly expanded, the speed and scale of the emergency overwhelmed the 911 system, according to Derek Alconis, a senior research programme manager and lead investigator at ULRI. Agencies also struggled to communicate with one another and maintain awareness of where crews were operating, hampering evacuation efforts.
The report also confirmed earlier assessments that the Palisades Fire was linked to an earlier burn in the area that the Los Angeles Fire Department (LAFD) had not fully extinguished. The report said the department did not have established standards for such work. The earlier Lachman Fire was allegedly caused by arson, with the trial of the man accused of starting it ending in a mistrial this summer after jurors failed to reach a verdict. A second trial is scheduled for this fall.
The LAFD said it was reviewing the report and accepted its findings regarding areas where the department needs to improve. The department said it had already introduced measures including improved staffing procedures during dangerous fire weather and new protocols to ensure fires are fully extinguished.
The Los Angeles Police Department did not respond to a request for comment, while the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department had not responded by the time of publication. The Los Angeles County Fire Department said it could not comment because of pending litigation.
The fires began during a windstorm in January 2025 and killed 31 people in the Pacific Palisades and Altadena communities. More than 16,250 homes and commercial buildings were destroyed, while many residents have yet to return to their properties.
Despite the failures identified in the response, ULRI researchers said the shortcomings did not cause the disaster. They noted that firefighters were confronted with extreme fire behaviour under powerful winds, with structures themselves becoming fuel for the rapidly spreading flames.
The report contains 175 findings and 266 recommendations, including expanded training for wildfire and incident management, portable satellite internet kits for command staff during communication failures and training firefighters to use water from residential swimming pools.
The review also highlighted successful elements of the response. Researchers credited the National Weather Service for effectively communicating the extreme fire-weather threat and praised Community Brigade volunteers for helping residents evacuate. Private firefighting companies were also credited with helping protect some structures and slow the spread of fire.
To prepare the report, researchers assessed more than 900 burned structures and interviewed 200 residents and 295 people working across 22 agencies involved in the response. They also reviewed 911 calls, radio communications, dispatch data, evacuation maps and staffing plans.
However, researchers said several agencies, including the LAFD and LAPD, did not provide records requested more than a year earlier. Missing material included emergency evacuation plans and records concerning the Lachman Fire, while LAPD did not provide certain dispatch, radio and officer reports.
ULRI researchers said the fires demonstrated that wildfire risk increasingly operates at the neighbourhood and regional level, requiring coordinated action across agencies and communities rather than relying on individual property owners or a single government agency.